

# **US Strategy for Dealing with a Nuclear-Arming North Korea**

## **Bibliography**

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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**Kim Jong Un's Grand Strategy and Regional Partners Goals**

Carlin, R. and R. Jervis (2015), "Nuclear North Korea: How Will It Behave?" *North Korea's Nuclear Futures Series*. US-Korea Institute at SAIS. <<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CarlinJervis-final.pdf>>.

*Carlin and Jervis share the view expressed in many other papers in this bibliography that Pyongyang is unlikely to reverse its nuclear weapons program; the authors, however, argue that North Korea's behavior (thus far) has not broken dramatically from its pre-nuclear diplomatic traditions. This USKI North Korean Nuclear Futures entry provides value to the academic corpus by addressing, head on, the more pessimistic commentaries that foresee dire and imminent consequences of a nuclear-arming North Korea.*

Pollack, J., T. Dalton, J. Lewis, S. Terry, and S. Y. Lee (2012), "No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, Book Review Roundtable," *Asia Policy* 13. <[http://nbr.org/publications/asia\\_policy/Free/AP13/AP13\\_NoExitBRRT.pdf](http://nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Free/AP13/AP13_NoExitBRRT.pdf)>.

*This January 2012 book review roundtable, which also features Pollack's responses to the reviewers, provides a concise analysis of the North Korean nuclear issue at the dawn of the Kim Jong-Un era. Pollack and the reviewers share a less-than-sanguine assessment of the efficacy of continued disarmament talks. According to these reviewers, Pollack's book provides much of the necessary intellectual backstopping necessary for this assessment to gain traction.*

Wit, J. S. and S. Y. Ahn (2015), "North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy," *North Korea's Nuclear Futures Series*. US-Korea Institute at SAIS. <<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/NKNF-NK-Nuclear-Futures-Wit-0215.pdf>>.

*Wit and Ahn's 2015 contribution to the North Korea's Nuclear Futures series provides an excellent overview of three expansion scenarios Kim's arsenal could take in the coming decade. The scenarios—summarized as minimal, steady, and maximum modernization—are defined from one another by both the numerical growth of the stockpile as well as the introduction of new delivery systems. The authors then forecast three North Korean nuclear strategy paradigms, based on the force modernization scenarios, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo can expect from North Korea as a result of the changed and changing North Korean nuclear arsenal.*

**North Korea's Nuclear Military Strategy**

Albright, D. (2015), "Future Directions in the DPRK's Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios for 2020," *North Korea's Nuclear Futures Series*. US-Korea Institute at SAIS. <[http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF\\_Future-Directions-2020.pdf](http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_Future-Directions-2020.pdf)>.

*David Albright examines three potential scenarios for the future of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, which consist of a low-end, medium, and high-end nuclear future. In doing so, he helps to discover the full band of possible outcomes, including both the best and worst-case outcomes. Taken together, the three scenarios provide a focal point for thinking about the future of North Korean nuclear policy.*

- Bermudez, J. (2015), "North Korea's Development of a Nuclear Weapons Strategy," *North Korea's Nuclear Futures Series*. US-Korea Institute at SAIS. <[http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF Nuclear-Weapons-Strategy Bermudez.pdf](http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_Nuclear-Weapons-Strategy_Bermudez.pdf)>.

*Joseph Bermudez analyzes the development of North Korea's nuclear weapons strategy. He then summarizes the history of the North Korean nuclear weapons program up through the present. He continues by discussing Albright's potential scenarios for the future of North Korea's nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery systems, and concludes by noting the ramifications of each scenario.*

- Mansourov, A. (2014), "Kim Jong Un's Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone Needs to Know," NAPSNet Special Reports. <<http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/kim-jong-uns-nuclear-doctrine-and-strategy-what-everyone-needs-to-know/>>.

*In this report, published about halfway between North Korea's third and fourth nuclear tests, Alexandre Mansourov dissects North Korean official statements and texts to offer his own conclusive analysis, in agreement with several Western analysts, that North Korea is unlikely to denuclearize in the foreseeable future. He argues that since introduction of the Pyongjin Line in March 2013, officials have solidified the prominent role that nuclear weapons play in the country's national development, security, and defense strategies; they also made an effort to secure the international image of a responsible nuclear power during peacetime. However, nuclear weapon development is a means to ensure an end, a setting conducive to regime survival and national development, and does not take precedence over economic development.*

- Narang, V. (2015), "Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers: North Korea and Iran," *The Washington Quarterly* 38:1. [https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ\\_Spring2015\\_Narang.pdf](https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Narang.pdf)>.

*In this article, Vipin Narang presents a typology of nuclear strategies that are available to regional nuclear powers and presents his theoretical framework for why these powers choose one pathway over another. He applies it to North Korea and Iran, providing insight into how each might approach decisions about their nuclear posture. His framework suggests that North Korea's nuclear strategy depends heavily on the future role of China as a patron, and that the United States should encourage China to continue playing such a role.*

- Smith, S. (2015), "North Korea's Evolving Nuclear Strategy," *North Korea's Nuclear Futures Series*. US-Korea Institute at SAIS. <[http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF Evolving-Nuclear-Strategy Smith.pdf](http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_Evolving-Nuclear-Strategy_Smith.pdf)>.

*In this addition to the North Korea's Nuclear Futures Series, Shane Smith builds from Vipin Narang's work in categorizing nuclear strategies. Smith helpfully includes a fourth nuclear strategy and refines the definition of one of Narang's strategies. The application of these four strategies to North Korea's nuclear evolution provides keen insights, including helpful indicators that North Korea's nuclear strategy has migrated from one strategy to the next.*

## Deterrence and Assurance in a Changed and Changing Security Environment

Jackson, V. (2015), "Alliance Military Strategy in the Shadow of North Korea's Nuclear Futures," *North Korea's Nuclear Futures Series*. US-Korea Institute at SAIS.  
<<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF-Jackson-Alliance-09151.pdf>>.

*Van Jackson considers the ramifications of North Korea's nuclear posture on alliance military strategy. He looks at some of the earlier work done by Vipin Narang on North Korean nuclear strategy and questions some of its conclusions. He explores the various challenges to combined military operations on the Korean peninsula and attempts to introduce potential solutions. Jackson's main proposals are to expand and diversify bases and port accesses, conduct tailored operations to avoid escalation, find ways to fight a limited conflict without out-of-theater force flow, and to leverage Japan more than Korean contingencies currently do.*

Jackson, V. (2016), "The Trouble with the US Bomber Overflight Against North Korea," *The Diplomat*. <<http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-trouble-with-the-us-bomber-overflight-against-north-korea/>>.

*In this article, Van Jackson builds on arguments from his recent book, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations, to explain why dispatching a B-52 bomber to South Korea in response to North Korea's self-proclaimed hydrogen bomb test actually diminishes the image of American resolve that North Koreans perceive, does not boost South Korea's perception of American reliability, and invites war. Holding that nuclear confrontation with North Korea is avoidable, Jackson advises the US and South Korea to illicit credible threats and meet conventional provocation with conventional retaliation. Jackson's work serves as a counterweight to arguments for more cautious action in response to North Korean provocative attacks, due to the North Korean regime's unpredictability.*

Kang, C. (2014), "Breaking the Myth of Missile Defense," Asan Institute for Policy Studies.  
<<http://en.asaninst.org/contents/breaking-the-myth-of-missile-defense/>>.

*Choi Kang lays out his argument in August 2014 for a more robust South Korean missile defense posture, including the recommendation to host THAAD missiles. His perceptive analysis continues to hold lessons for future developments on the peninsula, including the diplomatic use of THAAD deployments as leverage against China's support of North Korea.*

Park, C. K. and V. Utgoff (2013), "On Strengthening Extended Deterrence for the ROK-U.S. Alliance," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 68, Q1.  
<[http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-68/JFQ-68\\_84-90\\_Park-Utgoff.pdf](http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-68/JFQ-68_84-90_Park-Utgoff.pdf)>.

*Chang Kwoun Park and Victor Utgoff explain the steps taken and steps to be taken to strengthen the Washington-Seoul alliance in this 2013 paper. The authors offer up a series of scenarios that result in North Korean nuclear challenges to the alliance and a series of desirable tenets in future extended deterrence postures that would help salve the Pyongyang's provocations, like flexible stationing of US nuclear weapons in times of crisis, enhanced missile defense and conventional strike options, and joint control of the newly developed conventional strike capabilities.*

Santoro, D. and J. Warden (2015), "Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age," *The Washington Quarterly* 38:1.  
<[https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ\\_Spring2015\\_Santoro-Warden.pdf](https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf)>.

*In this paper, David Santoro and John Warden discuss efforts to assure Japan and South Korea of US extended deterrence. They analyze the current security environment in the post-Cold War era, and summarize the initial steps that the US has taken. They also explore the current assurance agenda and mention the important challenges and opportunities. Among the important themes they discuss are the divergence in threat perceptions between the two allies, along with a fear of American long-term commitment in East Asia.*

Smith, S. (2015), "Implications for US Extended Deterrence and Assurance in East Asia," *North Korea's Nuclear Futures Series*. US-Korea Institute at SAIS.  
<<http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NKNF-Smith-Extended-Deterrence-Assurance.pdf>>.

*Smith asserts that North Korea's increasing nuclear capabilities put critical strain on US extended deterrence and security assurance relationships in the Asia-Pacific region. He challenges Kenneth Waltz's argument that nuclear proliferation generally ensures peace by asserting that nuclear weapons could embolden North Korea to advance the intensity of its provocative behavior. This piece is especially useful in conjunction with Wit and Ahn's "North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy," as Smith considers the authors' three proposed scenarios for the nuclear capabilities of a North Korea five years into the future in his analysis of extended deterrence and assurance implications.*

Takahashi, S. (2012), "Ballistic Missile Defense in Japan: Deterrence and Military Transformation," Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Center for Asian Studies, Security Studies Center.  
<<http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp44av59takahashi.pdf>>.

*In this 2012 paper, Sugio Takahashi presages the impact that growing North Korean missiles would hold for Japan. He points to the salience and future importance of ballistic missile defense in the Japan-US alliance and walks through the relevant changes to Japanese defense thinking via his historical analysis of Japan's QDR equivalent, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPGs). He also provides a prescient catalogue of future challenges to missile defense in Northeast Asia, including a North Korean ICBM decoupling the US from Japan and F-35 deployments potentially driving Pyongyang toward a first-strike incentive.*

## **Extended Deterrence, Escalation, and Conflict Management**

Bennett, B. (2012), "Deterring North Korea from Using WMD in Future Conflicts and Crises," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*.  
<<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA571012>>.

*In this work, Bruce Bennett offers concrete policy options the US and its allies could take in a crisis to deter North Korean provocations and actions. His policy prescriptions follow the major categories in deterrence literature, clustering around deterrence-by-punishment and deterrence-by-denial options. Further, he underlines the observation that deterrence operates in the mind of the adversary; Pyongyang's thinking can be unpredictable and the status quo can sometimes be less attractive than rolling the dice during a crisis.*

Utgoff, V. and M. Wheeler (2013), "On Deterring and Defeating Attempts to Exploit a Nuclear Theory of Victory," Paper No. 4978, Institute for Defense Analyses.

*In this article, Victor Utgoff and Michael Wheeler describe the theory of nuclear victory and explain how such a war would be expected to evolve. They present several scenarios that might lead to such a war and explain general approaches for strengthening deterrence prior to that event. They offer a specific list of recommendations for the United States to deter attempts to exploit the theory of nuclear victory. The authors conclude by noting that the US does not currently have the necessary survivable C3I capabilities to fight a restrained nuclear war, something that should be of concern to policymakers.*

## **Deterring North Korean Vertical Proliferation**

Carlson, J. (2016), "Dealing with the North Korean Nuclear Threat," *The National Interest*. <<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/dealing-the-north-korean-nuclear-threat-16102>>.

*John Carlson emphasizes the necessity of finding a "circuit breaker" for the North Korean situation before it escalates into a regional crisis. He describes the limited efficacy of further sanctions and points out that even a resumption of the six-party talks would be dependent on North Korean goals. He mentions that a starting point in future negotiations should be the settlement of a peace treaty to end the 1953 Armistice Agreement but that difficulties remain with North Korean acceptance of verification arrangements.*

Klinger, B. (2016), "Showing More Resolve on North Korea," *War on the Rocks*. <<http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/showing-more-resolve-on-north-korea/>>.

*Bruce Klinger argues that congressional action on sanctions has increased US leverage with regard to North Korea and China and criticizes the Obama administration for being reluctant to seek stronger sanctions. He makes the point that the resulting steps from the EU, South Korea, and the Philippines will collectively increase pressure on the Kim regime. He concludes by arguing that the international community has suffered from a "collective lethargy" in the face of North Korean belligerence and cautions that "sheepishness is contagious."*

Walsh, J. and J. Park (2016), "To Stop the Missiles, Stop North Korea, Inc." <[http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/opinion/to-stop-the-missiles-stop-north-korea-inc.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/opinion/to-stop-the-missiles-stop-north-korea-inc.html?_r=0)>.

*This March 2016 New York Times Op-Ed presents the argument that sanctions and interdiction are insufficient to halting North Korea's continued advancements in their nuclear and missile programs. The authors argue that diplomacy will be necessary to truly curtail the North Korea issue, but a robust effort—necessarily undertaken with Chinese and American cooperation—to dismantle North Korea's overseas businesses, shell companies, and joint ventures is the only way to make the sanctions regime work.*

Yoon, S. (2016), "Stopping North Korean Missiles: An Alternative to THAAD," *The Diplomat*. <<http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/stopping-north-korean-missiles-an-alternative-to-thaad/>>.

*The author, a retired South Korean Navy Captain, questions the idea that the THAAD system is the best and only choice for South Korea in response to North Korea's missile program. He*

*argues that sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is a better option for several reasons. He points out that it will be costly for KAMD to develop a THAAD-like capacity for the brief time window required to intercept North Korean missiles in the close geography of the Korean Peninsula. He also highlights that the plan for land-based KAMD is unproven in the US and in the Middle East and that sea-based BMD programs have a longer track record. He concludes by noting that the ROK and US militaries have experience with high-intensity air defense at sea and says that joint BMD coordination provides a learning opportunity.*

## **Towards an Integrated Strategic Approach**

Brechtol, B. E. Jr. (2011), "Planning for the Unthinkable: Countering a North Korean Nuclear Attack and Management of Post-Attack Scenarios," NAPSNet Special Reports. <<http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/planning-for-the-unthinkable-countering-a-north-korean-nuclear-attack-and-management-of-post-attack-scenarios/>>.

*This article, first published in the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, grants clarity to the occasionally foggy debates over the North Korean nuclear capacity. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. seeks to answer the questions that remain about North Korea's nuclear capabilities and argues for the US-ROK alliance to emphasize prevention and deterrence of a nuclear war with North Korea. The casualties from a North Korean nuclear attack alone would be in the tens of thousands at least, he reasons, and a preemptive strike on North Korea would likely unleash a war on the Korean Peninsula.*

Cronin, P. (2014), "If Deterrence Fails: Rethinking Conflict on the Korean Peninsula," Center for a New American Security. <<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/if-deterrence-fails-rethinking-conflict-on-the-korean-peninsula>>.

*Patrick M. Cronin offers a dense analysis of the implications for military planning of the country's generally increasing instability and the heightening sense of uncertainty that surrounds North Korean actions. In light of these situational elements, Cronin joins fellow strategist in arguing that the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula in the next one to five years cannot be ruled out and that the US-ROK alliance must focus not only on deterrence, but also on building defensive and offensive wartime capacities. The high level of detail in his concluding recommendations greatly supplements the literature meant to assist US and South Korean decision makers.*

Cronin, P., ed. (2016), "Breakthrough on the Peninsula: Third Offset Strategies and the Future Defense of Korea," Center for New American Security. <<https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report-BreakthroughonthePeninsula-Finalb.pdf>>.

*In this edited volume, academics and experts offer their views on the Third Offset's implications for the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the security of South Korea. The five key recommendations for the US center around enhanced dialogue among allies and developing new conventional strike and missile defense technologies via the South Korean and American advantages over North Korea in innovation, research, and development. Mira Rapp-Hooper's chapter on extended deterrence effectively captured many of the themes identified in the CGSR workshop, including strengthened intelligence sharing, credible limited war options, and hardened basing options in South Korea.*

Lieber, K. and D. Press (2013), "The Next Korean War," *Foreign Affairs*.  
<<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2013-04-01/next-korean-war>>.

*Without elaborating in-depth military strategy, this piece provides a clear, concise overview of wartime concerns. Kier Lieber and Daryl Press delve quickly to what they see as the heart of the deterrence issue for the US and South Korea vis-a-vis North Korea: in the case of a conventional war on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea may be prepared to employ a version of NATO's Cold War strategy and threaten a nuclear strike in order to bring the war to a ceasefire. Their recommendations to the US and South Korea stress war avoidance and means of deterring nuclear escalation.*

Manzo, V. and A. Miles (2016), "The Logic of Integrating Conventional and Nuclear Planning," *Arms Control Today*.  
<[https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016\\_11/Features/The-Logic-of-Integrating-Conventional-and-Nuclear-Planning](https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_11/Features/The-Logic-of-Integrating-Conventional-and-Nuclear-Planning)>.

*In this November 2016 article, the authors argue that tighter integration between conventional and nuclear operations will enhance deterrence and reduce the likelihood of nuclear employment by an adversary. They offer three concrete suggestions to strengthen integration: a) building conventional operations that shape the enemy's escalation decision making, b) strengthening the military's resilience to nuclear operations, and c) providing integrated response options that are limited and credible. The piece is not directed specifically at the Korean peninsula deterrence problems, but its broad policy treatment and recommendations are applicable and instructive to the workshop's endeavor.*

Roberts, B. (2013), "Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia," *National Institute for Defense Studies, Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1*.  
<<http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf>>.

*Brad Roberts lays out his thinking on the important trends in the Northeast Asian security environment in this 2013 paper. He points to a series of vexing policy questions that remain salient today, including appropriate levels of investment in missile defense, allied contributions to North Korean-centric conventional strike capabilities, and the degree of tailoring necessary to bolster the US extended deterrence and assurance posture in the region. The paper, commissioned by the Japanese National Institute of Defense Studies, focuses primarily on the US-Japan nexus but also touches on US and Japanese interactions with China, South Korea, and North Korea.*

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